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Abstract:  
 
Empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer 
binding period decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest into a risky 
asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback 
frequency and binding period to analyze how both variables alone contribute to the change in 
myopia and how they interact. We find a strong effect for the length of commitment, a much 
less pronounced effect for the feedback frequency, and a strong interaction between both 
variables. The results have important implications for real world intertemporal decision 
making. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates two important features of intertemporal decision making. First, it con-
siders how decisions are influenced by the number of periods a decision maker is committed 
to a decision, i.e. for how long he is bound to his choice. Take the stock market as an example 
for intertemporal decision making. Suppose you own some cash and want to make an invest-
ment into some risky asset, given some fixed planning horizon (e.g. your year of retirement). 
Does the amount you invest into the risky asset depend on the time you have to stay commit-
ted to your investment, e.g. does it depend on whether you can change the amount invested 
each month or only each year? The second feature that is studied is the feedback frequency. 
Considering the stock market context again, the question arises if the frequency of feedback 
does influence the amount invested into the risky asset. Take, e.g., a (risky) investment fund 
that sends information about its current value each year vs. another fund that sends similar 
information each quarter. Does the difference make people invest more or less into such 
funds? In addition to the impact of each of these variables alone, one has to ask if there is any 
interaction between length of commitment and feedback frequency. Knowing the answers to 
the above questions is essential. The sheer amount of long term investments into the stock 
market makes it worthwhile to study factors which influence these investments. Defined con-
tribution saving plans in which investors split their monthly contribution between a bond and 
a stock fund, are a real world example for the decision situation investigated in this paper.  
In addition to the practical relevance of our study, our results are important for inter-
preting previous work. It will be shown that one can not properly interpret previous results 
without understanding the independent and joint influence of feedback frequency and com-
mitment. Finally, knowing the influence of both variables might help us to design better in-
vestment decision support tools. 
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The concept of myopic loss aversion (MLA), introduced by Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995), can answer some of the above questions. The key idea of MLA is that, because of loss 
aversion, a sequence of risky investments looks less attractive in myopic evaluation. This ar-
gument was originally confirmed in the controlled environment of two experimental studies. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) examined which portion of a riskless endowment participants were 
willing to invest in a risky asset, whereas Thaler et al. (1997) asked individuals to split their 
money between two assets of different riskiness. In both studies, a manipulation of the degree 
of myopia systematically influenced the willingness to invest in the riskier option: If partici-
pants received less frequent feedback and were forced to make a binding multi-period deci-
sion, they evaluated the assets less myopically and were more willing to accept the risk. 
These original results on the impact of myopia on risk taking were confirmed and ex-
tended in many ways. Haigh and List (2002) replicated the study of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997) with traders from the Chicago Board of Trade and found even stronger effects of 
MLA. Professional experience thus does not seem to weaken the bias. Gneezy, Kapteyn and 
Potters (2003) demonstrated the effect in an experimental market setting. Market prices for 
risky assets were significantly higher if feedback was provided less frequently and decisions 
were binding for several periods. Markets thus do not seem to eliminate MLA. Langer and 
Weber (forthcoming) build on Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) to derive re-
fined hypotheses about the impact of myopia on risk taking. They confirmed their predictions 
in an experimental setting similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997). Summing up, all the evidence 
on MLA suggests, that the willingness to invest into the risky asset is influenced by the simul-
taneous manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period.1 However, we know basi-
cally nothing about each factor’s influence alone or about a possible interaction effect.  
In our study, we find three main results. First, binding decisions cause people to be less 
myopic, perhaps because it forces them to think over a longer time horizon. Participants in-
vest more into the risky asset in the binding condition than in the non-binding condition. This 
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tendency does not diminish over time. Second, providing less frequent feedback seems to help 
people learn over time that it is better to go with the risky prospect, i.e. to be less myopic. 
Third, there is not a simple main effect for the combination of binding and feedback, but an 
interaction between these two variables. The strongest effect is observed when participants 
have their decisions bound, but receive frequent feedback. The effect is even stronger than the 
combination of long binding period and less frequent feedback. It seems that if people’s deci-
sions are bound, more frequent feedback is helpful, because over time it becomes more salient 
how occasional losses are wiped out by larger gains. 
In Section 2, we will present some conceptual thoughts on MLA and introduce hypothe-
ses as well as  the design of our study. The results are presented in Section 3. The paper ends 
with a short discussion in Section 4.  
2 Some General Thoughts on MLA and Experimental Design  
2.1 Myopic Loss Aversion 
MLA combines two important behavioral concepts: loss aversion and myopic evaluation. 
Loss aversion refers to the fact that in the evaluation of a risky alternative individuals tend to 
weigh losses more heavily than gains.2 Myopia is the short-sightedness that induces a decision 
maker to evaluate each alternative of a sequence independently whereas a rational decision 
maker would evaluate the sequence as a whole. Loss aversion implies that a myopic decision 
maker will invest too little into the risky asset, i.e. myopia leads to decreased willingness to 
take risks. The question addressed in this paper is to what degree myopia (and thus the risk 
attitude) is influenced by commitment and by feedback, and how these two variables interact.    
Most experimental research on MLA uses the feedback frequency and simultaneously the 
binding period to manipulate myopia. Less frequent feedback delivers distributional informa-
tion on a more aggregated level, a longer binding period induces investors to think some peri-
 5
ods ahead. The experimental finding that these manipulations lead to a higher willingness to 
invest in a lottery sequence (Gneezy and Potters 1997, Haigh and List 2002, Gneezy, Kapteyn 
and Potters 2003) shows that the feedback frequency and the binding period are in fact able to 
influence the degree of myopia in the evaluation. The results of Langer and Weber (forthcom-
ing), though questioning the robustness of MLA, provide additional support for this mecha-
nism. They extend the argument from myopic loss aversion to myopic prospect theory (MPT) 
considering not only loss aversion but also diminishing value sensitivity. MPT implies that 
myopia results in stronger risk aversion for most sequences of alternatives but results in lower 
risk aversion for sequences based on alternatives with small loss probabilities and high loss 
sizes. They find experimental support for their refined predictions, demonstrating on the one 
hand that the effect of myopia on risk taking is less general than suggested by MLA, but 
showing at the same time that the basic mechanism of inducing different degrees of myopia 
through the feedback frequency and the binding period seems to be robust. 
In this paper, we are only interested in the phenomenon of inducing different degrees of 
myopia. To avoid potential ambiguity in the results due to the divergences between MLA and 
MPT, our experimental analysis concentrates on alternatives for which the predictions about 
the impact of myopia on the attractiveness of the sequence of gambles are unique. For a pros-
pect that offers a 40% chance to gain 7% on the invested amount and a 60% chance to lose 
3%, as used in our experiment, a less myopic evaluation of multiple plays should be generally 
(i.e. in MLA and MPT) more attractive. 
In addition to the separate consideration of binding and feedback, our design differs from 
most designs used in the literature (e.g. Gneezy and Potters 1997) in one important aspect.  
Most studies use an additive approach, i.e. the decision maker faces identical investment op-
portunities in each period and the aggregated outcome of the decision sequence is the sum of 
all single decision outcomes. 
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where FW is the final wealth, X is the identical (new) endowment in each period, α(t) is the 
proportion of endowment invested into the risky asset in period t with 0 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1, r(t) is the 
return on the risky asset in period t, and T the planning horizon.3 
We use a multiplicative approach instead, in which the returns of the periods are com-
pounded. Investors receive an initial endowment that is transferred from period to period, al-
tered by the outcomes of the investment decisions. 
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where FW’ is the final wealth, Y is the initial endowment, α(t) is the proportion of current 
wealth invested in the risky asset in period t, r(t) is the return on the investment in period t, 
and T the planning horizon.  
Clearly, the multiplicative case is more realistic than the additive case as it better resem-
bles the accrual of returns in real asset markets. On the other hand, it might lead to weaker 
results regarding MLA. Myopia must be expected to be less extreme since the obvious rele-
vance of early round decisions for later round endowments might induce investors to think in 
a less myopic manner. It is interesting to examine, how strong the effects of MLA remain in 
this more realistic multiplicative setting.  
In the following we will present the hypotheses first and then explain which design is 
needed and used to test the hypotheses.  
2.2  Hypotheses 
This paper is about the effect of binding and feedback on myopia which itself influences the 
amount invested into the risky asset. As described in formula (2), α(t) is the percentage of 
current wealth a person invests in period t into the risky asset. Thus α(t), or just α in case the 
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period is of no importance, is the key variable for which hypotheses should be derived. We 
will use the notation α* for the average percentage invested over the whole planning horizon. 
There will be two conditions for binding: “b” for single period binding and “B” for multiple 
period binding, and two conditions for feedback: “f” for frequent feedback which will be 
given each period and “F” for feedback on a less frequent basis. Thus, e.g. the variable αBf(t) 
denotes the percentage of wealth invested into the risky asset in period t, where the decision 
maker is committed to his investment decision for multiple periods, but receives feedback 
about outcomes after each period.4  
 The first hypothesis states that we will be able to extend the results presented in the 
literature for the additive case to the multiplicative case: A longer binding period and simulta-
neously less feedback will increase the amount invested into the risky asset.5  
 Hypothesis 1:   αbf*  < αBF*. 
The second hypothesis states that both binding and feedback frequency alone will influence 
the amount invested into the risky asset. Section 2.1 has shown that the degree of myopia 
influences α. Now, both more binding and less feedback frequency should mitigate myopia 
which is the rationale behind hypothesis 2.  
 Hypothesis 2:  αb•*< αB•* and α•f*  < α•F*. 
We ex ante see no reason to hypothesize any interaction effect between both variables (even if 
we have found one).  
 
 So far we have considered the average allocation over time. Next, we will present 
some refined hypotheses regarding the pattern of allocations over time. Previous experimental 
research has shown that allocations to the risky asset will generally increase over time, inde-
pendent of the specific treatment. Langer and Weber (forthcoming) found such an effect for 
an additive allocation scenario. Similar empirical evidence can be found in Weber and 
Camerer (1992), where individuals played an investment game. We believe that in these asset 
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allocation experiments learning plays an important role. Over time, subjects learn to cope 
with the risky situation in the experiments, ambiguity about the whole process is diminishing. 
This results in an increase of risk taking.  
Hypothesis 3:  For all treatments, the proportion of wealth α(t) invested in the 
risky asset increases over time.  
So far, we have not considered a possible difference between the effect of binding and the 
effect of feedback. Clearly, it should make a difference in the beginning of the experiment. 
Binding should have an immediate effect, as through binding subjects become less myopic 
right away. In contrast, feedback should just influence subjects over time (and should not 
have any effect in period 1). 
 Hypothesis 4:  α•f(1) = α•F(1)      and     αb•(1) < αB•(1). 
 
2.3 Design of the Experiment 
In our computerized experiment, participants faced 30 independent draws of the same gamble. 
At the beginning of the experiment, each individual received an initial endowment of 25 € 
which could be totally or partially invested in a lottery L = (+7 %, .4; –3 %, .6) that increased 
the invested amount by 7 % or decreased it by 3 % with the stated probabilities. This gamble 
has an expected return of +1 %. Following the multiplicative case, the endowment in period 
t+1 was equal to the outcome of the investment in period t plus the amount transferred, i.e. not 
invested in period t: Y(t + 1) = Y (t) [α (t) [1 + r(t) ] + [1 – α (t) ]]. Participants were fully 
informed about the return distribution of the asset and the fact that asset returns of different 
periods were stochastically independent.  
Two factors were varied within the experiment, binding period and feedback frequency, 
resulting in a 2x2 design. Short binding – condition b – was for one period, longer binding 
(longer commitment) was for three periods – condition B. High frequent feedback was given 
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each period – condition f - , low frequent feedback was given after each third period – condi-
tion F . 
In design bf, subjects were asked in each period to make a new allocation decision, i.e. to 
state which portion of their current endowment they wanted to invest in the risky asset. Fol-
lowing the decision, the lottery was played out and the change in wealth calculated and dis-
played. Figure 1 shows a typical screen from the experimental condition bf. On the top left 
side of the screen the current wealth (here 28.62 €) is displayed. Below, the allocation deci-
sion is made by either using a slider or typing in the number (here 91 %). The feedback box at 
the bottom appears after the draw and presents the outcome of the gamble (here –3 %) as well 
as the calculation of gains or losses and the new wealth (here 27.84 €). 
Insert Figure 1 
In design Bf, participants` allocation decisions were binding for three rounds. Hence, though 
the gambles were played out and the feedback was presented in each round, participants could 
only adjust their allocation after each third round. In design bF, feedback about the outcome 
of the investments was presented on a more aggregated basis. After each third round partici-
pants received information about the total change of wealth since the last provision of feed-
back. Nevertheless, allocations could be adjusted in each single round. In design BF, partici-
pants made binding decisions for three rounds and got feedback information only about the 
aggregated change of wealth over the three periods. 
 The experimental subjects were master students from Mannheim University recruited 
in an advanced finance class. Overall 107 students took part in the experiment, 26 in treat-
ment BF and 27 in each of the other treatments. They individually entered the computer lab 
and were randomly assigned to one of the treatments by the computer. They read the instruc-
tions on the screen, were given the opportunity to ask questions, and independently started the 
experiment. The outcomes of the gambles were randomly generated for each individual par-
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ticipant by the computer, according to the specified return distribution. On average, the ex-
periment took about 30 minutes, 15 minutes for reading the instructions and 15 minutes for 
the 10 (in treatments Bf and BF) or 30 (in treatments bf and bF) allocation decisions. All par-
ticipants received a flat show up fee of 3 € and had a 10 % chance to be picked by the com-
puter for real payment according to their final wealth in the experiment. The twelve selected 
individuals earned an additional 30.19 € on average. The payment procedure was ex ante 
known to participants. 
3 Results6 
The average allocation for the different conditions are given in Table 1 and in Figure 2. 
Insert Table 1 
Table 1 shows that we find a main effect for binding (αb•* < αB•*, p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney 
one-tailed) but no effect for feedback. Thus hypothesis 2 can only be partly confirmed. This is 
surprising given the fact that in most other studies presented in the literature so far the feed-
back frequency is suggested to be the driving force. Figure 2 helps to understand the surpris-
ing result. It clearly demonstrates that there is a significant interaction effect (ANOVA, 
p < .05) between both variables binding and feedback frequency. Both manipulations alone 
increase the percentage invested into the risky asset (αbf * < αBf *, p < .01 and αbf * < αbF*, p 
< .05) as the dotted lines visualize. However, the joint effect is reversed (αBf* > αBF*, n.s) or 
not existent (αbF*≈  αBF *) at best. The data indicate that the effect of a longer binding period 
is stronger when the feedback frequency is higher. We will discuss this finding in more detail 
below. Nevertheless, we can confirm hypothesis 1 and thus replicate the usual findings in a 
multiplicative setting (αbf * < αBF *, p < .05). 
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Insert Figure 2 
Next, we consider the hypotheses regarding the development of allocations over time. To give 
a first overview of the data, figure 3 displays the average allocation to the risky asset at each 
point of time, α*(t), for each condition. Allocations in general seem to increase over time, as 
predicted in hypothesis 3, though the effect is far from being monotonic. 
. 
Insert Figure 3 
For a first simple test of hypothesis 3, we compute for each individual the average allocation 
in the second half (periods 16-30) and in the first half (periods 1-15) of the experiment and 
define the ‘trend’ to be the difference between these numbers. As shown in table 2, the me-
dian trend turns out to be positive in three of the four treatments. It is highest in treatments bF 
(11%) and lowest in treatment BF (0%). By a Wilcoxon signed rank test the trend is signifi-
cantly positive on a 1% level for treatments Bf and bF and on a 5% level for treatment bf. In 
treatment BF the effect is insignificant, we even observe more participants with a negative 
(11) than a positive (9) trend. 
Insert Table 2 
Hypothesis 4 states that the allocation in period 1 is the same both for low and high feedback 
frequency and that it is larger in case subjects make binding decisions for three periods. Cal-
culating the medians (means) we get:  
α•f(1) = 50.0% (49.3%) ,  α•F(1) = 50.0% (49.8%) and  
αb•(1) = 36.5% (41.5%),  αB•(1) = 50.0% (57.6%) .  
The difference between α•f(1) and α•F(1) is insignificant, the difference between α•b(1) and 
α•B(1) significant on a 1% level. The results clearly support hypothesis 4. 
In our examination of hypotheses 1-3, we have considered average allocations over the 
complete course of the experiment. We now want to investigate how much subjects will allo-
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cate to the risky investment in the long run. This seems especially important in light of the 
applications mentionend in the introduction. Based on the allocations during the experiment, 
we estimate a process that converges to some limit allocation α(∞), or α∞ for short, for t →∞. 
More explicitly, we consider a partial adjustment model 
           α’(t) = b+c⋅α’(t-1)         (3) 
and estimate the parameters b, c, and α’(1) to minimize the quadratic deviation of α’ from α.7  
Because of the interfering end effects in the data (s. Figure 3), we exclude the allocations of 
the final three rounds from the fitting procedure.8 We further impose the natural restriction on 
the allocation function α’(t) to be in the domain [0, 1] for all t. This is achieved by restricting 
the estimated parameters to α’(1)∈ [0, 1], c∈ (0, 1), and b∈ [0, 1-c]. The function then mono-
tonically converges to the long run allocation )1( cb−∞ =α ∈[0, 1] for t →∞.  
 
Insert Figure 4 
To provide a general impression of the results, figure 4 presents such fitted functions α’(t) for 
the average allocations within each treatment. It can be seen that α’(t) is increasing in all four 
treatments (giving further support to hypothesis 3). The values of b, c, α’(1), and )1()( cb−=∞α  
are summarized in table 4. Again, the interaction effect is shown in the data as αBf (∞) and 
αbF (∞) are both larger than αBF (∞). In the long run, the combined manipulation of feedback 
frequency and binding period thus seems to have less impact on the willingness to invest into 
the risky asset than each manipulation alone. 
 
Insert Table 3 
To test the significance of the long run effects, we use the above described procedure to fit 
functions α’(t) to each individual’s allocations and compare the resulting individual long run 
allocations α(∞) for the different treatments. The results are summarized in table 5.  
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 Insert Table 4 
 
Interestingly, in conditions Bf and bF more than half of the participants have an α(∞)-value of 
100%, i.e. in the long run their willingness to invest is only limited by the fact that at the 
maximum the complete endowment can be invested. A Mann-Whitney test shows that αbf(∞) 
is significantly smaller than αBf (∞) on a 1% level, whereas the difference between αbf(∞) and 
αbF(∞) is only marginally significant.9 Thus, even in the long run, subjects invest more into 
the risky asset when decisions are made binding or feedback is given more frequently – no 
such effect is observed if both manipulations are present.10 
4 Discussion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of binding period and feedback frequency on myopic 
loss aversion and examine the robustness and determinants of the phenomenon. In contrast to 
pre-vious studies, our experimental design is based on a multiplicative scenario that better 
resembles the investment process in real asset markets. We further disentangle the intertwined 
manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period, commonly used in previous research, 
to better understand how both aspects contribute to the change in myopia.  
We find that both isolated manipulations have an impact on myopia and thereby the 
willingness to invest, also in the multiplicative scenario. Surprisingly, we find a strong and 
persistent interaction effect. The effect of the feedback frequency is reversed for the long 
binding period. This is an interesting result as usually the manipulation of the feedback fre-
quency is considered the main driving force for myopic loss aversion effects in experimental 
studies. The underlying intuition is that a longer binding period induces the decision maker to 
think about the consequences of the investment decision in a more far-sighted way, thereby 
moderating the negative effects of narrow framing (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). This effect 
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is especially strong if the decision makers get frequent feedback, i.e. they easily learn over 
time that occasional losses are wiped out by larger gains. Contrary to previous research, limit-
ing feedback helps people to learn not to behave myopically but not so when you bind deci-
sions. In that case, the binding manipulation actually gets investors into a broader time hori-
zon but now the feedback manipulation (i.e. limiting feedback) in conjunction with binding, if 
anything, has a negative effect. This effect becomes especially clear as for the estimated be-
havior in the long run.  
The documented effect of decision flexibility on risk taking behavior has obvious rele-
vance for investment advice and the design of saving plans. Making investment decisions 
unchangeable for many periods could –somewhat counterintuitive– help to increase the inves-
tor’s willingness to invest in risky assets. Stock funds should advertise the possibility to make, 
e.g., a year long commitment, but should send statements more frequently during the year.  
Quite a number of questions remain. We found the effects described in the literature to 
persist in a multiplicative setting, whereas we do not know which of the two settings (addi-
tives and multiplicative) induces stronger effects. It is not clear to what degree our results (as 
well as the results presented in literature so far) depend on the specific parameters chosen in 
the experiment (type and parameters of the sure and risky alternative, differences between low 
and high frequency feedback and differences between periods of commitment). Finally, our 
explanation for the strong effects of frequent feedback and longer binding is ex post. It 
would be worthwhile to run new studies to better understand the nature of this important in-
teraction effect. 
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1 A different approach is used in Benartzi and Thaler’s (1999) analysis of MLA. They manipulate the presenta-
tion format of the lottery sequence and rule out a myopic evaluation by displaying the aggregated distribution of 
the sequence instead of the repeated trial format. 
2 For a review of loss aversion cf.  Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
3 The fraction 1-α(t) is kept at hand and thus remains unchanged. 
4 We will denote αf• (t) and αF•(t) if we consider the average amount invested for “f” and “F” for both binding 
conditions. Note, that α•B(t) has to remain unchanged for those periods where the decision is binding.  
5 It should be clear that decreasing the decision flexibility is not just a framing issue, but a slight change of the 
decision problem even from a normative point of view. As Gneezy and Potters (1977) argue, however, the effect 
on the risk taking behavior should be minor. 
6 Note that all tests in the result section are nonparametric and are based on medians unless specified otherwise.  
7 This process is used in market experiments to estimate equilibrium prices (see, e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Weber, 1989). 
8 Such end-effects are also found in other similar experiments, e.g. Weber and Camerer (1992). We belief that 
these experiments reflect the conventional wisdom that one should lower the exposure to risk at the end of the 
planning horizon. 
9 Marginal significance is also given for the difference between αBf (∞) and αBF (∞). 
10 Thus the long run data is not in line with hypothesis 1 and not in line with the findings of previous studies. It 
should be noted, however, that the previous research mostly concentrates on average allocations over time and 
does not consider estimated long run allocations. Thus our results are not directly comparable to the literature. 
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 αb•* αB•* α•f * α•F* 
 n=54 n=53 n=54 n=53 
Mean 58.4% 69.4% 63.3% 64.4% 
Median 57.8% 70.0% 64.3% 64.7% 
 
Tab. 1: Average proportion of wealth invested in risky asset lottery over all 30 rounds 
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Design bf Bf  bF  BF 
 N=27 n=27 n=27 n=26 
Mean trend 7.2% 9.5% 10.5% 3.2% 
Median trend 7.3% 6.0% 11.0% 0.0% 
# of subjects with pos. (neg) trend 20 (7) 17 (5) 17 (6) 9 (11) 
Signed rank test (Wilcoxson) p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 n.s. 
 
Tab. 2: Change of average allocation in first half (rounds 1-15) to average allocation in second half (rounds 16-
30) of the experiment. 
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Condition bf Bf  bF  BF  
α’(1) 38.0 % 61.7 % 39.1 % 53.8 % 
b 0.091 0.064 0.109 0.132 
c 0.836 0.923 0.849 0.804 
 55.8 % 82.8 % 72.1 % 67.7 % )('lim)( )1( ttc
b αα ∞→− ==∞
Tab. 3: Process α’(t) = b+c⋅α’(t-1) fitted on average allocations in each design. 
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 αbf (∞) αBf (∞) αbF (∞) αBF (∞)  
mean  62.0 % 83.8 % 78.0 % 67.0 % 
median  71.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 71.0 % 
Tab. 4: Long run allocations α(∞), individually determined for each participant.  
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Fig. 1: Screenshot from condition”bf” (translated). 
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Fig. 2: Interaction of binding and feedback manipulation 
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Fig. 3: Average allocation to the risky asset for each period and each treatment 
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Fig.4: Average allocations in each treatment and fitted process α’(t) = b+c⋅α’(t-1). 
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Original Instruction Screens of Internet Experiment “Does Binding or Feedback…”   (and translations). 
 
 
 
Welcome to this internet experiment for the finance course at the university of 
Mannheim 
----- 
Dear participant of the experiment, 
 
We would like to thank you for taking your time to participate in this experiment. 
Please first read the instructions carefully. If there are any unclear statements, please 
do not start the experiment, but send an e-mail with your question to 
sekretariat@bank.bwl.un-mannheim.de. 
 
If the same questions are asked repeatedly, we will set up a FAQ- section (frequently 
asked questions) on the entry page to the experiment at www.internetexperiment.de. 
On this page you can check for answers to your question in advance. 
 
Go on 
 
 
 
In this experiment you will repeatedly be asked to make investment decisions. In the 
beginning you will receive an initial endowment of 25 €. In each round, you can invest 
your current endowment (completely, partly or not at all) in a risky asset. Here, you 
will not be asked about the absolute, but the relative amount of investment (“x% of 
your current endowment”). 
 
The risk profile of the asset (in the following referred to as lottery) will be visualised 
as follows:  … 
 
With the here shown lottery the invested capital would 
have a return of 10% with a probability of 70% (10 € would become 11 €) 
have a return of 0% with a probability of 20% (you would get the invested 10 € back) 
have a return of –20% with a probability of 10% (for an investment of 10 € you would 
only get 8 € back). 
 
Go on   /  Back 
 
  
The actual lottery outcomes in the experiment will be generated randomly and 
individually by the computer, taking into account the quoted probabilities. 
 
We would like to emphasize that there are no manipulations. You can trust us that the 
results of you investments will be played out according to the provided probabilities. 
 
The outcomes in the different rounds are independent, i.e. the outcomes in earlier 
rounds do not influence the probability of the results in later rounds. 
 
To give you an incentive to think carefully about your decision, we will choose a 
portion of the participants (exactly one tenth of the participants) randomly and pay 
them according to their wealth at the end of the experiment.  
 
This means that in case you are selected, you will receive exactly the amount in real 
money that you have accumulated at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
 
We will ask you for you Student ID at the beginning of the experiment. This is 
important for the payment mechanism. The list of Ids (selected for payment) will be 
announced in the finance lecture as well as displayed on the entry page for the  
experiment www.internetexperiment.de. The possibly earned money can be picked up 
in the departmental administration office. For identification purposes an ID-Card is 
required. For that reason it is extremely important that you  enter your correct Student 
ID-Number. Your ID will only be used for  payment purposes , all other data collected 
in the experiment will be analysed anonymously. 
 
In this context we would also like to mention, that you cannot participate several times 
in the experiment in order to improve your chances. Repeated participation with the 
same Student ID-Number will not be taken into account. For that reason, you can also 
not stop the experiment in an early stage and start it later again. For the second try, you 
would not have the chance to be chosen for the real payment, as your ID has already 
been registered at the start of your first incomplete attempt of the experiment. In case 
of technical difficulties that cause a break off, please contact the departmental 
administration office to discuss further steps. 
 
  
We are conducting this experiment to gain insights about individual decision making. 
 
Please support our research by making your decisions on your own (no group 
discussions) und please do not talk to your classmates that have not done the 
experiment yet. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
Please enter your Student ID-Number now. 
 
Please remember that with this step you will be registered for the experiment and thus 
cannot stop it anymore without loosing the chance of receiving the real payment. The 
experiment will take approximately 20-30 minutes. 
 
My Student ID-Number is: 
 
 
Now the actual experiment does start. 
You will play overall 30 rounds, in which the investment option is always (i.e. in each 
single round) described by the following lottery.  …   
 
You can thus gain 7% on the invested amount with a probability of 40% and lose 3% 
of the invested amount with a probability of 60%.  
 
B/F: Each investment decision you make is valid for three rounds, i.e. the percentage 
of wealth you chose for investment is fixed for 3 rounds. Thereafter you can 
chose a new percentage. (screenshot) 
B/f: Each investment decision you make is valid for three rounds, i.e. the percentage of 
wealth you chose for investment is fixed for 3 rounds. Thereafter you can chose a 
new percentage. However, you will receive feedback about the change of your 
wealth after each round. 
b/F: Before each round you have to decide again which part of your endowment you 
want to invest. However, you will only receive feedback about the change of 
your current wealth after each third round. 
b/f: Before each round you have to decide again which part of your endowment you 
want to invest.  
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